

AFGHANISTAN



USCENTCOM

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OPERATION MAGISTRAL



AFGHANISTAN

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FOREWORD (U)

(U) Much of the information dealing with Afghan culture and Mujahedin tactics came from an article by Colonel Ali Jalali, Afghanistan armed forces, titled "The Soviet Military Operation in Afghanistan and the Role of Light and Heavy Forces at the Tactical and Operational Level."

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GEOGRAPHY (U)





Figure 3 - Afghanistan is a country with harsh terrain and varied climatic conditions (U)


CULTURE (U)

Ethnic Groups

- | | | | |
|--|--------------|--|---------|
| | Pushtun | | Uzbek |
| | Tajik | | Turkmen |
| | Hazara | | Baluch |
| | Chahar Aimak | | |



Percent of Total Population



Unclassified
 R00278/446740 2 85



Figure 5 - Mujahedin children are trained to be marksmen at a young age. Children raised during the war will grow up to be deadly guerilla fighters. (U)



Yunis Khalis



Jalaluddin Haqqani

Figure 6 (U)

(Figure 7).




Figure 7 - HIK fronts within Paktia Province (U)




Figure 8 - U.S. STINGER missile (U)




Figure 9 - Tribal lands along the Gardeyz to Khowst road (U)




Figure 10 - Gardeyz to Khowst road (U)




Figure 11 - Sate Kandaw Pass (U)

THE PLAN (U)




Figure 12 - The Plan (U)




Figure 14 - The Second Stage (U)

THE OPERATION (U)




Figure 15 - The Last Week of November (U)




Figure 16 - Sate Kandaw Pass (U)




Figure 17 - Positions on 20 December (U)




Figure 18 - Positions on 30 December (U)




Figure 19 - Alternate Convoy Route through Ghazni (U)



Figure 20 - Introduction of the STINGER missile forced the Soviets to revise their air tactics (U)

(U) The Soviet news agency TASS reported the occurrence of Soviet interception of Mujahedin radio signals. This makes probable that some interception of Mujahedin radio signals occurred, revealing tactical information to the Soviets and RA about rebel locations, intended movements, fire support, etc. (Figure 21).



Figure 21 - Mujahedin radio use (U)



**Figure 22 - Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev
called Afghanistan a "Bleeding Wound" (U)**